The paper reviews the literature on the relationship between democracy and armed conflict, internal as well as interstate. The review points to several similarities between how democratic institutions affect both conflict types. It summarizes the main empirical findings, discusses the most prominent explanations, and reviews some recent challenges to the position that there exists a democratic peace. The most critical challenge is the position that both democracy and peace are due to pre-existing socio-economic conditions. I conclude that this argument has considerable leverage, but it also seems clear that economic development is unlikely to bring about lasting peace alone, without democratic institutions.
process where states gradually learn to form (democratic) pacific unions. He shows that the risk of war between democracies has been falling over the past two centuries. The risk of non-democratic war has also declined, but less swiftly. Relatedly, Mitchell (2002) shows that non-democracies in the Americas became much more likely to settle territorial claims peacefully when the proportion of democracies in the system increased. Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) , on the other hand, argue that regime type becomes a less salient indicator of 'otherness' as more states become democratic, and their empirical analysis indicates that the risk of conflict between democracies has increased as the world has become more democratic.
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Studies using tools of network analysis also indicate systemic effects of democracy. Dorussen and Ward (2010) and Lupu and Traag (2013) find support for the democratic peace while accounting for the pacifying impact of trade networks. Maoz (2006) finds that large 'democratic cliques' in networks dampen conflicts, but Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) conclude that the support for this claim is weak when using a more appropriate statistical method.
The internal democratic peace
When it comes to internal armed conflict, a number of studies find empirical confirmation of an 'inverted-U' relationship between level of democracy and the probability of onset of conflict. Semi-democratic regimes have a higher risk of internal conflict than consistent autocracies or democracies (Boswell and Dixon, 1990;  3 Also see the reviews of the dyadic and monadic democratic peace in Ray (1993) , Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) and Russett (2009) .
4 See Harrison (2010) and Snyder (2013) for recent reviews. 5 The empirical analysis in Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) is contested in Dafoe, Oneal and Russett (2013) , however.
Muller and Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . The existence of an 'inverted U' has been challenged, however (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Vreeland, 2008) . 6 In any case, very few studies find traces of a monotonic effect of democracy. When controlling for GDP per capita or other indicators of socio-economic development, democratically governed countries have no lower risk of internal armed conflict than autocratic ones.
7 Buhaug (2006) finds that semi-democracies have a higher risk of wars over government than autocracies and democracies, but that democracies are more likely to experience conflicts over territory than the other two regime types. Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2010) find democratization to affect conflicts over government, but not over territory.
Although democratic institutions by themselves are ineffective in reducing risk of internal conflict onset, several studies find that they affect how internal conflicts evolve. Lacina (2006) and Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand (2009) show that internal wars in democracies are less lethal. Democratic governments make use of less violence against civilians (Eck and Hultman, 2007) and engage in less repression (Davenport, 2007b; Colaresi and Carey, 2008) , 8 but rebel groups tend to make more extensive use of violence against civilians when fighting democratic regimes (Eck and Hultman, 2007) . Possibly because of the stronger constraints on the use of violence against insurgents, democracies tend to have longer internal wars (Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand, 2009 ).
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Some studies, such as Mukherjee (2006) , find that post-conflict democracies have a lower risk of conflict recurrence. Other studies report contrasting results (Walter, 2004; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008) .
Explanations

Interstate conflict
Although there is scholarly agreement that democracies rarely if ever have fought each other, there is less consensus as to why. The following five sets of explanations are important:
First, the normative explanation (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993) holds that 'the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries as well' (Ember, Ember and Russett, 1992, 576) . States 'externalize' the domestic norms that encourage compromise solutions and reciprocation, and strictly inhibit the complete removal from political life of the 6 For a discussion of this challenge, see Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand (2009) . Relevant to this is the question of whether one should control for the stability of institutional constellations. Part of the reason semi-democracies have a higher frequency of conflict is that they are more likely to see institutional changes.
7 One partial exception is Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) who find that systematic exclusion of ethnic groups from political power increases the risk of conflict.
8 See Davenport (2007a) for a comprehensive review. 9 Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004), Fearon (2004) , and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) , on the other hand, find no link between regime type and duration of conflict.
loser in political contest.
The absence of a monadic democratic peace is troublesome for the normative explanation, in particular since it implies that the probability of conflict between democratic and non-democratic states must be higher than that between two non-democracies (Raknerud and Hegre, 1997) . Proponents of the explanation argue that the least restrictive norms dominate the democratic norms since states cannot endanger their very survival (Maoz and Russett, 1993) . Rosato (2003) points to the frequent violation of liberal norms when democracies have decided to go to war -in imperial wars, as well as in frequent US interventions intended to overthrow democratically elected governments (Rosato, 2003, 589-590) .
10 Another notable caveat is the incentive to intervene in non-democracies to press for democratization -a concern going back to Kant (1795 Kant ( /1991 . Indeed, there are several examples of this normatively troublesome side-effect of the democratic peace (Peceny, 1999; Gleditsch, Christiansen and Hegre, 2007) . A particularly critical view of democratic war behavior is found in Geis, Brock and Müller (2006) .
Second, according to the legislative constraints explanation, democratic leaders are constrained by other bodies (such as parliaments) which ensure that the interests of citizens and powerful organizations are taken into account. Debate is public, so information on the real costs of war are likely to enter the decision calculus.
Democratic political leaders will be removed from office if they circumvent these constraints. Choi (2010) is one recent example of empirical support for this explanation.
Democracies' ability to signal resolve is a third explanation. Why are states not able to agree to a solution that reflects the distribution of power and the actors' 'resolve', without incurring the costs of war (Fearon, 1995) ? One answer is that if crisis escalation is not very costly, both parties have an incentive to exaggerate their power or resolve, mobilize, and then to back down when they realize the bluff is discovered. Fearon (1994) argues that audience costs -the costs that a leader suffers when backing down -lock leaders into their positions, increasing the costs of bluffing. Democracies have higher audience costs, Fearon argues, and may more credibly commit to policies with little crisis-inducing behavior to signal intentions.
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Making use of various empirical strategies to distinguish the explanations, Schultz (1999) and Prins (2003) find stronger support for the signaling argument than for the constraints explanation. Weeks (2008) builds on this argument by showing that single-party regimes also indicate behavior in line with a signaling argument. Downes and Sechser (2012) , Borghard (2011), and Trachtenberg (2012) , on the other hand, find little empirical evidence for the audience cost argument.
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Colaresi (2012) notes that secrecy allowed Israel to deliver a crushing first strike on Egypt in 1967.
The obvious advantage of secrecy raises questions as to how audience costs can work in practice. Colaresi argues that institutions that ensure transparency retrospectively solves this dilemma. He demonstrates that democracies with strong oversight institutions are more likely to win militarized disputes.
Fourth, in a mobilization argument Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999; argue that leaders facing 10 Also see Downes and Lilley (2010) . Rosato's argument was countered by Kinsella (2005) and other contributions in the same issue of the APSR.
11 The audience cost and legislative arguments arguably also imply a monadic democratic peace.
12 But see the debate in Security Studies 21(3) following Trachtenberg's article.
democratic reelection pressures tend to make them more careful to select only wars they are likely to win, and to mobilize more resources for the war efforts they select than do autocratic leaders. This makes democracies unattractive targets, since they are likely to win the wars they fight (Reiter and Stam, 1998) .
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Both of these tendencies tend to reduce the probability of war between democracies.
One aspect of the effectiveness of democracies in war is their ability to form large alliances in important wars (Doyle, 1986; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997) . The empirical analysis in Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) , however, suggests that democracies are less reliable allies. Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009) , on the other hand, find that countries with democratic institutions are much less likely to abrogate international commitments than autocratic ones in instances where domestic leadership transitions result in leaders with different primary bases of societal support.
Fifth, Gartzke (1998) points out that the democratic peace finding might be due to joint interests.
Democracies may fail to disagree sufficiently on international policies to be willing to suffer the costs of war.
Such joint interests may be due to the fact that most democracies were on the same side during the Cold war (Farber and Gowa, 1995) . 14 The failure to observe a monadic democratic peace (Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013, 172) and the observation of an 'autocratic peace' (Werner, 2000; Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002) support this argument. 15 An autocratic peace can hardly be explained by constraints inherent in autocratic regimes, but must be due to shared interests. Gartzke (1998; shows that controlling for joint interests weakens the magnitude and significance of the evidence for a democratic peace.
16 Joint interests and joint regime types may be linked through three pathways. First, joint democracy may itself give rise to joint interests, such as an interest in the promotion of democratic regimes or through similar incentives for political leaders to expand the territory they control.
The profitability of occupation is less certain for democratic leaders than for autocratic ones, since the benefits of occupation have to be shared between almost as many as those who bear the costs (Rosecrance, 1986) .
Moreover, in order to extract much from the conquered territory, the population resident there have to be denied the same political rights as the citizens of the occupying country. 17 Hence, joint democracy may lead to the mutual acceptance of international borders, removing an important source of war (Huth and Allee, 2002) . Relatedly, Schweller (1992) argues that regime type affects how declining powers behave. When challenged by rising powers, realist theory posits that leading powers wage preventive wars to maintain their military hegemony. Preventive wars are less attractive to democratic leaders. If the rising power is another democracy, the historical absence of war between democracies indicates that the threat is minimal. If it is non-democratic, the public is wary of the risks and costs of a war where the danger is not imminent, and the formation of alliances to counter-balance the non-democratic threat is often a preferable strategy.
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13 This proposition is contested, however. See Brown et al. (2011) for a collection of essays on democracies and war victory. 14 Gowa (2011, 169) maintains that 'dispute and war rates by dyad type converge after the collapse of the bipolar system' using much more recent data. This conclusion is contested in Park (2013) , however.
15 Raknerud and Hegre (1997) , however, demonstrates that the 'autocratic peace' to a large extent is due to the tendency for democracies to ally with each other in large multi-actors wars.
16 Note that Oneal and Russett (1999) question how much the democratic peace is due to joint interests. 17 Such dual standards certainly exist, but they often imply some normative costs related to the occupation. 18 See Levy (2008) for an extensive review of this argument.
Internal conflict
The earliest arguments for an internal democratic peace are related to the normative and structural explanations of the interstate variant. Democracy is seen as a system for peaceful resolution of conflicts, as conflicting claims by rival social groups are solved by majority votes or consensual agreements. If individuals are denied the political rights and the economic benefits they see themselves as entitled to, they will react with aggression and organize violent political opposition. If conflict results from 'relative deprivation' (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968) , democracies should be more peaceful internally than other regime types. Armed rebellion will not be profitable since democracies both allow discontent to be expressed and have mechanisms to handle it.
Another argument holds that democratic institutions alter the risk of internal conflicts by facilitating effective bargaining and reducing commitment problems. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 24-25) note that citizens are excluded from de jure power in a non-democracy. Still, they always enjoy some de facto power that sometimes allow citizens to obtain policy concessions from the elites in the short run. It is uncertain whether these will be maintained, however, since the balance between various social groups is transitory.
Citizens, then, should demand that today's de facto power is translated into a change in de jure power that can secure concessions in the long term. This demand may be backed by a threat of revolution -a civil war. The elites can counter this by promising policy concessions also in the indefinite future. This promise is not credible, however, as long as de facto power is transitory. Democratic institutions is the solution to this commitment problem (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) . This explains democratization, but also why democratic institutions reduce the risk of (revolutionary) civil wars. Fearon (1995) also argue that bargaining failures and commitment problems are important explanations of war, and Fearon (2004, 288 ) notes that democratic regimes should facilitate bargaining and credible commitments also for internal conflicts. These attempts to seeing democratic institutions as commitment devices are to some extent related to the signaling explanation for the interstate democratic peace.
If either of these accounts are true, one would expect that the conflict-proneness of fully-fledged democracies would be lower than in repressive autocracies. One possible reason for not observing this is that democracies often are faced with opportunistic rebels whose aims do not reflect the interests of broad social groups. For internal conflicts, a parallel to the mobilization argument formulated for interstate conflict would encounter difficulties. Both democracies and non-democracies use military force to counter illegitimate armed opposition, but autocracies may make much more extensive use of repression without losing legitimacy -using violence to silence opponents, censorship, arbitrary imprisonment without trial, etc. Autocracies may indiscriminately target entire population groups to coerce influential individuals (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Carey, 2010) . 19 Autocracies also buy off other parts of the opposition by granting ministerial posts, and by the selective channeling of public funds (Fjelde and de Soysa, 2009 ). The combination of these two methods allow effective divide-and-rule strategies. Autocracies also inhibit the formation of organizations
19 Also see Davenport (2007b) .
before they can reach the stage of armed insurgencies. Hence, regimes that feature both democratic and autocratic characteristics, are partly open yet lack effective means of solving conflicts. In such political systems, repression is difficult since some organization of opposition groups and some opposition expression of discontent is allowed, but mechanisms to act on the expressed discontent are incomplete (cf. Davies, 1962; Boswell and Dixon, 1990; Muller and Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001) . Hence, repression is ineffective at the same time as 'grievance' is not addressed, which is why we observe an inverted-U relationship between democracy and peace.
All in all, precisely because of the constraints on indiscriminate use of force, democracies may be disadvantaged when faced by opportunistic rebel groups. This claim has recently been contested, however.
Analyzing data for insurgencies over the 1800 period, Lyall (2010 finds no evidence that democracies are more frequently defeated or have to sustain conflict for longer periods.
Does democracy cause peace?
Empirically, the correlation between democracy and interstate peace is well established, as is the one between consolidated democracies and absence of internal conflict. Still, this does not necessarily mean that democracy causes peace. Two main objections have been raised to that causal inference -that it rather is peace that causes democracy, or that some other societal factors cause both democracy and peace. Since these counterarguments largely focus on what explains democratic institutions at the country-level, the arguments apply both to the domestic democratic peace as well as the interstate one.
Putting the cart before the horse?
An implicit assumption in many statistical studies of the democratic peace is that the causal arrow flows from democracy to peace. Albeit not dismissing the pacifying effect of democracy completely, Thompson (1996) and Rasler and Thompson (2004) show that geopolitical constraints that were in place before democratization can account well for the subsequent peace. Layne (1994, 45) argues that democratic regimes can afford democratic systems, 'because there is no imminent external threat that necessitates a powerful governmental apparatus to mobilize resources for national security purposes'. Boix (2011) shows that democratization has been more frequent during periods where democracies have been hegemonic powers. Gates, Knutsen and Moses (1996, 5) add that peace leads to trade, investment and economic growth, and thereby to democratization. Indeed, the idea of a reverse causation goes at least back to Wright (1965 Wright ( /1942 . Mousseau and Shi (1999) discuss the temporal aspects of the reverse causation issue, and conclude that there is little evidence that autocratization tends to occur during or after wars -in fact, the opposite may be the case when democracies win the wars (Mitchell, Gates and Hegre, 1999) . The main threat to the democratic peace proposition is change toward autocracy in anticipation of war. By means of interrupted time-series analysis, Mousseau and Shi (1999) find no clear trend of states changing toward autocracy before wars.
Using instrument-variable methods, Kim and Rousseau (2013) agree that the democracy-peace correlation holds even when accounting for the pre-existing amount of violence in a region. Reiter (2001) (2007) indicates that exogenous predictors of border stability tend to decrease the likelihood of territorial disputes and increase the probability of joint democracy, and that the evidence for the democratic peace is weaker when predictors of border stability are controlled for. The conclusions remain in doubt, however, as Park and Colaresi (forthcoming) report inability to replicate the results. Gibler and Tir (2010) expands the notion of territorial settlements to one of 'positive territorial peace', and show that peaceful territorial transfers lead to democratization and lower levels of militarization.
The issue of reverse causation has not been equally prominent in the study of democracy and internal conflict, with some notable exceptions in particular in studies of repression and violence (Carey, 2006; Moore, 1998) . The relative-deprivation argument, however, implies reverse causation. If deprivation is due to the lack of political rights, and civil war is a useful strategy to obtain such rights, war should lead to democracy.
In contrast to this expectation, however, Gleditsch and Ward (2006) do find that civil wars tend to undermine democracies but do not affect the durability of autocracies.
What drives democratization and peace?
The perhaps most serious challenge to the democratic peace comes from arguments suggesting that both democracy and peace are outcomes of more fundamental societal changes. Most of these are associated with socio-economic development.
Institutional consolidation
A possible indication of this is that the interstate democratic peace is weaker for young democracies (Maoz and Russett, 1992) . Indeed, the process of democratization may increase the risk of war in the short run 20 The analysis in Reuveny and Li (2003) is hard to interpret, however, since they attempt to model the effect of conflict on the democracy level of both states in the dyad, using a weak-link design that seems partly inappropriate.
21 Boix (2003, 228) notes, however, that territorial settlements are not the only explanation of the European 'growth miracle'. (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995) . 22 Relatedly, changes in the political institutions of a country are likely to be accompanied with a heightened risk of civil war (cf. Snyder, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Cederman, Hug and Krebs, 2010) . Firstly, changes in a democratic direction are likely to be accompanied with reduced repression, allowing communal groups to mobilize. In addition, it takes a long time to make new institutions sufficiently efficient to accommodate deep social conflicts. Groups that increase their political influence will raise their expectations of real improvements in their living conditions, but these can be slow to materialize. Losers from the institutional changes, then, have an incentive to incite armed insurgencies to reestablish the previous status quo. Fearon and Laitin (2003) interpret the inverted-U finding for internal conflicts as due not to the institutional characteristics themselves, but to an underlying conflict over the setup of the system: ' "anocracies" are weak regimes, lacking the resources to be successful autocrats or containing an unstable mix of political forces that makes them unable to move to crush nascent rebel groups' (p. 85). This interpretation is supported by Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) . Their proxy of instability (a variable recording recent irregular transitions of power) is associated with a high risk of conflict onset. Moreover, when controlling for it, they find a monotonic negative relationship between democracy and risk of conflict.
Elections provide a special case of change -not to the institutions, but to the de jure distribution of power within electoral regimes. In new democracies, there is considerable uncertainty whether the main actors are truly committed to respecting the outcomes of elections. Most actors prefer to secure power by means of electoral victory since it bolsters the legitimacy of their rule. If they lose, however, they may find an attempt to seize power by force preferable to accepting the defeat. Several studies confirm that elections tend to be followed by an increased risk of internal conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008) or ethnic conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug, 2013) .
Market norms
Mousseau (2000) argued that both democratic consolidation and the democratic peace is due to a specific set of norms of contracting. These norms emerge in economically developed countries by a 'process of cultural materialism'. Economic development requires a complex division of labor which typically is achieved through a dense web of voluntary contracts. These contracts pave the way for democratization since they foster norms of negotiation, of trust, equity between contractees, and respect for property rights. The international manifestation of such norms is more peaceful behavior, since wars of conquest would violate these norms.
An implication of this argument is that only developed democracies can maintain a separate peace. This expectation is supported in a set of statistical studies of interstate conflict (Mousseau, 2000; Mousseau, Hegre and Oneal, 2003; Hegre, 2000) and internal conflict (Hegre, 2003; Collier and Rohner, 2008) .
Controlling for a more direct measure of 'contract-intensive economies' (CIE), Mousseau (2009) however, reject this conclusion. Still, they do find support for the effect of CIEs controlling for joint democracy and acknowledge that there is some overlap between the democratic peace and the effect of CIEs (Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013, 209) .
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Lootability
Another aspect of economic development is that it favors non-lootable or non-appropriable assets over lootable ones -'commerce' is gradually replacing 'conquest' since 'labor, capital, and information is mobile and cannot be definitely seized' (Rosecrance, 1986, 48) .
This development-related change has an analogy in internal conflicts. When land-based assets such as most primary commodities are economically dominant, states have strong incentives to use physical force to retain control, and potential insurgents have similar incentives to try to seize control over the central power or to obtain larger autonomy for a region. This argument reflects the importance placed on primary commodity exports by and Fearon and Laitin (2003) . Several rebel economic activities require high rebel territorial control, such as taxation of natural resource production, rich landowners, or household incomes (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . In the words of Boix (2008, 432) , 'In economies where wealth is either mobile or hard to tax or confiscate, sustained political violence to grab those assets does not pay off since their owners can either leave in response to the threat of confiscation or are indispensable to the optimal exploitation of assets.' Boix finds strong empirical evidence for this account, and it is supported by numerous empirical studies that show that extensive reliance on the export of oil -a highly appropriable asset -is associated with conflict as well as authoritarian rule (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fjelde, 2009; Ross, 2001 ).
Relatedly, the models of democratization in Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) provide an explicit link between democratization and civil war -elites agree to democratization because they fear a revolution staged by the poor. Democratization, they argue, is least likely when inequality is extensive, since the redistributive tax rate preferred by the median voter then will be very high. Revolutions, then, will be more frequent in unequal societies, since the elites have a stronger incentive to resist democratization.
If the assets that the rich control are in the form of land or other resources that cannot be moved out of the country, the poor will be able to impose radical taxes if they get to control the tax rate (Boix, 2003) .
If most of the wealth is in the form of financial capital, a larger fraction of it is 'safe' from taxation, and democratization is less threatening. Moreover, where lootable assets are predominant, rebel groups have incentives to stage limited campaigns not to entirely take over the government, but to secure local access to profitable natural resources.
23 Dafoe, Oneal and Russett (2013) show that Mousseau's main inference hinges on an erroneous interpretation of the interaction term between democracy and CIE -in their replication, joint democracy retains considerable explanatory power even when controlling for the CIE term. They also question the quality of the proxy variable for CIEs used by Mousseau (2009) .
Joint interests
The democratic peace seen as merely 'joint interests' (Gartzke, 1998) may also be a function of economic development, as noted in Rosecrance (1986) and Gartzke (2007) . Well into the twentieth century, an 'obsession with land' was the major cause of war since states could improve their position by seizing other nations' territory (Rosecrance, 1986, 48) . During the twentieth century, however, mobile factors of productioncapital and labor -surpassed land in importance for productive strength. At the same time, nationalist resistance to occupation became more frequent, increasing the cost of extracting resources from a territory (also see Boix, 2003, 44-45) . In addition, the diversity of resources employed speaks against a military strategy (Rosecrance, 1986; Brooks, 1999) . Development may provide the motive and means for a state to seize a particular territory from another by force, but it also increases its dependence on third parties. War hampers trade with third parties either because of political reactions or because the heightened risk resulting from conflict increases the price of traded goods. The constraints imposed on developed states through their extensive trade with a great number of other nations is apt to outweigh the prospect of gaining control over one particular territory.
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Developed societies that are economically reliant on the revenues from international trade and investment, place much more emphasis on the protection of property, political stability, and the integrity of international borders than on expanding own territories. Developed societies, then, have a joint interest in restricting attempts of territorial expansions such as Saddam Hussein's conquest of Kuwait, and a lack of interest in contesting own borders. Similar joint-interest explanations also apply to internal conflicts and to the incentives to resist democratization. Economic development, and in particular the reliance on relations with international markets, also means that a large set of actors become reliant on preserving political stability.
Interdependence
In several theories of democratization (Dahl, 1971; Olson, 1993; Boix, 2003) , the high costs of violence and repression in densely interacting societies is an important factor. Dahl (1971) sees 'modern dynamic pluralist' societies as an essential prerequisite for democracy -democracy prevails because citizens can credibly threaten to hurt the elites economically by means of strikes, protests or by exiting the country. The diversification and division of labor in developed economies leads to both democracy and to internal peace.
For interstate conflict, a similar argument states that strong dependence on trade and on capital constrains belligerent actors (Angell, 1910; Russett and Oneal, 2001 ). Domestic and foreign capital is likely to flee the country if war breaks out. Less capital-intensive economies are less constrained by these considerations (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001) . In a critical review of the democratic peace, Gat (2005; 2006, 658) argues that it has overlooked the industrial revolution: 'Rather than the cost of war becoming prohibitive [...] , it was mainly the benefits of peace that increased dramatically once the Malthusian trap was broken, tilting the overall balance between war and peace for [...] industrializing and industrial societies, regardless of their regime, for which wealth acquisition ceased to be a zero-sum game.'
The capitalist peace Gartzke (2007) argues that the liberal peace really is a 'capitalist peace'. The rhetoric value of this term is greater than its precision. In effect, Gartzke's argument draws on several of the effects of socio-economic development reviewed above. Interdependence and mobility of assets are equally important as the particular economic freedoms and financial structures traditionally associated with 'capitalism'. Echoing Rosecrance, Gartzke argues that development 'leads states to prefer trade to theft' (p. 172), but does not weaken their resolve to defend their borders. At the same time, developed states are typically militarily powerful and are able to wage wars over long distances. Since many wars are fought over non-territorial issues (e.g. to defend a particular political system in another state, or to prevent the development of nuclear capabilities), developed states are willing to fight long-distance wars where conquest is not the motivation. This leads Gartzke to expect that development leads contiguous dyads to be less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes and non-contiguous dyads to be more likely to do so. He finds support for both these hypotheses, and finds that the terms representing the democratic peace are non-significant when controlling for the 'capitalist' factors. Gartzke and Hewitt (2010) obtain similar results for international crises.
The capitalist peace challenge to the democratic peace is taken up by Dafoe (2011) and Choi (2011) , who show that the democratic peace retains support in the model of Gartzke (2007) with some specification changes that most analysts would agree are improvements to the original. The complete replication results presented in Choi (2011) shows, however, that the substantial effect of the democratic peace is weaker when controlling for 'capitalist' factors than without, and Gartzke's main hypotheses retain support in their replications.
Any residual effects of democracy?
The arguments reviewed here may imply that socio-economic development is an important pre-condition for the democratic peace, both in the context of interstate and internal conflicts. It would be premature to conclude that development completely removes the importance of democratic institutions, however. First, if the economic underpinnings for democracy were sufficient for citizens' welfare, we would not have seen the systematic trend of transitions toward democracy when states become economically more developed (Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003; . Because of commitment problems, the 'invisible hand' of the market is insufficient to prevent conflict. Both elites and citizens see the need to design institutions that formalize access to decision-making power and also bind both sides to this formalization should the underlying balance of power change at some point in the future.
One might also argue that development presupposes some kernels of democratization. For instance, the emergence of market norms crucially depend on the protection of property. Effective autocratic governments can protect property against 'roving bandits', but have a harder time ensuring market actors that they will resist the temptation to confiscate the property of citizens. This, according to Olson (1993, 572) , can only happen when rulers have very long time horizons, and long time horizons are credible only in democratic systems: 'History provides not even a single example of a long and uninterrupted sequence of absolute rulers who continuously respected the property and contract-enforcement rights of their subjects'. Indeed, Olson (1993, 574) claims that 'Individual rights to property and contract enforcement were probably more secure in Britain after 1689 than anywhere else, and it was in Britain, not very long after the Glorious Revolution, that the Industrial Revolution began'. If so, democracy is causally prior to development. At least, it is likely that democracy and economic modernization have developed in a dialectic process not unlike the Kantian learning process discussed in Cederman (2001) . This process is probably related to a general shift in norms against the use of violence. Several of the long-range processes discussed in Gat (2006) and Pinker (2011) may be seen as informing explanations of democratization as much as explanations for the decline of war.
Moreover, democracy and development may require each other to produce socially optimal outcomes.
Mousseau (2000) and Mousseau, Hegre and Oneal (2003) find that the effect of democracy is contingent on development. Dafoe, Oneal and Russett (2013, 206) acknowledge that democracy and development might mutually reinforce each other: 'Economic norms may express themselves more forcefully in liberal polities; moral concerns weigh more heavily when people are rich; the stability and bargaining credibility made possible by democracy ... is more robust when governments are dependent on capital'. Moreover, development in general strengthens and stabilizes democratic institutions (Przeworski et al., 2000; Gates et al., 2006) , 25 and developed democracies should therefore be better able to constrain leaders and affect their audience costs and incentives to avoid failed wars.
In the case of domestic conflict, Hegre (2003) ; Collier and Rohner (2008); Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand (2009) also find democracy to reduce the risk of internal conflict more effectively in high-income countries.
This may be because the democratic strategies for maintaining order may be more costly than the autocratic strategies. Identifying and prosecuting individuals within groups that make use of illegal means of protest takes more resources than indiscriminate repression of the entire group. To maintain a democratic civil peace, the government must be capable of actively affecting the societal distribution of resources, as well as of preventing abuses of one social group by another. Most democracy data sets measure the extent to which governments are accountable and constrained, but rarely capture their capabilities to implement their decisions. Hegre and Nygård (forthcoming) indicate that such capabilities are equally important as the de jure institutions. Relatedly, political systems that combine democratic and autocratic features, for instance, may be regarded as having low capability because of their lack of consistency (Gates et al., 2006; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010) . Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) , moreover, show that after the end of the Cold War, an increasing proportion of internal conflicts have been 'symmetric non-conventional' where both the 25 However, see Boix and Stokes (2003) .
government and the rebels lack the capacity to fight regular wars. This trend coincides with an increased number of low-income, low-capacity democracies, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Development also affects the policy incentives for democratically elected leaders. Illiterate populations are often unable to make use of the democratic institutions to constrain the elected leaders. Elected offices are extremely valuable to their incumbents in societies with immobile assets and extensive inequality (Boix, 2008) , widespread corruption and few alternative economic opportunities, inducing incumbents to concentrate on retaining power rather than serving the electorate. In sum, leaders in low-income democracies may be both less able and less willing to address social conflicts that underlie 'relative-deprivation' mechanisms.
Development does not have the same effect in non-democratic systems. Hegre (2003) indicates that violent conflict becomes more frequent in authoritarian states as they modernize. This is in conflict with the empirical implications of the 'opportunity' or 'feasibility' accounts of conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009) . Development, to the extent it fosters 'modern dynamic pluralist' societies, may tend to shift the balance in favor of 'justice-seeking' rather than 'loot-seeking' motivations for internal conflicts, since the education, urbanization, economic levearge associated with development raise the political expectations of citizens and help them resolve their collective action problems. It is clear that demands for democratization tend to intensify with higher education levels and the increased dispersion of economic leverage in modern economies. As exemplified by the recent conflicts in Libya and Syria, elites that resist these demands run a risk of escalating such conflict to civil war. Economic development may be a necessary condition for the democratic peace, but not a sufficient one.
Relatedly, the autocratic means to maintain order, on the other hand, do not become more effective with increasing development. First, widespread repression is more likely to meet widespread popular resentment the more educated the population is. With more human and social capital at hand, citizens are better able to force a repressive government to change its behavior. Eventually, the elites may be forced to open up the political system to allow the formation of democratic political systems. This transition process often is associated with civil conflict.
Conclusions
This review has discussed recent research on the relationship between democracy and armed conflict, covering both conflicts internal to countries as well as interstate ones. Although there are many differences between the interstate and domestic conflict, the review indicates there are also several similarities. In particular, some important challenges to the democratic peace apply to both types of conflict. The most fundamental one, in my view, is that there might be underlying social changes that explain both the development of democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of social conflicts. These changes are typically summarized as socio-economic development, and typically work through the incentives for using physical force for political goals. At the same time, as recently seen in Syria, relative economic development in itself is not sufficient to prevent armed conflict. Democratic institutions are formal codifications of non-violent conflict resolution procedures. Socio-economic development is likely to change societies such that non-violent conflict resolution is an underlying pareto-optimal equilibrium, allowing actors to agree to such codifications. In the absence of the formal codifications, however, actors may be unwilling to trust that this underlying equilibrium exists.
Hence, democratic institutions may be necessary to allow the beneficial changes due to development to be manifested as more peaceful societies.
The review suggests several avenues for future research. First, there is no consensus on the relative importance of multiple explanations of the empirical observations. A recurrent challenge is to identify empirical implications that allow distinguishing clearly between them. This requires new data -democratic peace research tends to rely excessively on a very limited number of datasets. This is particularly true for the measure of democracy, where most studies use the Polity dataset (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Marshall, n.d.) .
Disaggregating the institutions along the lines of Carey (2007) and Fjelde (2010) will be helpful, as well as making use of new datasets measuring various aspects of democratic institutions (e.g., Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2013; Regan, Frank and Clark, 2009; Coppedge et al., 2011) .
Another is to explore the dynamics between socio-economic changes, institutional changes, and the incentives for the use of political violence posed by the challenges reviewed above. There is much to learn from how these factors relate to exogenous factors such as changes in technology or in demographics (Dyson, 2012; Gat, 2005; Urdal, 2005) , and how changes in one of them affect the others. 
